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The transmission of avian H5N1 influenza viruses to 18 humans in Hong Kong in 1997 with six deaths established that
avian influenza viruses can transmit to and cause lethal infection in humans. This report characterizes the antigenic and
biological properties of the H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from chickens, ducks, and geese from farms and poultry markets
in Hong Kong during 1997 and compares them with those of virus isolated from the index human case. Each of the H5N1
viruses from Hong Kong poultry markets that were tested were lethal in chickens, possessed polybasic amino acids at the
carboxy-terminus of HA1, and by definition were highly pathogenic in poultry. The available nonpathogenic H5 influenza
viruses and the pathogenic H5N1 virus from Hong Kong were analyzed with monoclonal antibodies prepared to A/chicken/
Pennsylvania/1370/83 (H5N2). The analysis revealed limited antigenic drift in 15 years and established that monoclonal
antibodies are useful reagents for identification and antigenic analysis of avian strains that may transmit to humans in the
future. One of the monoclonal antibodies permitted separation of the H5N1 influenza viruses from poultry into two groups
that correlated with the presence or absence of a carbohydrate at residue 158 adjacent to the receptor binding site on HA.
The H5N1 viruses examined replicated in geese, pigs, rats, and mice, but to only a very limited extent in ducks. It is
noteworthy that all infected geese shed virus and that the H5N1 viruses caused disease signs and death in a portion (3 of 16) of
the geese, with evidence of systemic spread to the brain. The tropism for geese is unusual and may provide insight into the
origin of these viruses. In mice, the H5N1 virus caused lethal pneumonia and spread systemically to the brain. Mice would
thus provide an ideal model system for studying immune responses and pathogenesis. Transmission experiments in chickens
revealed that the H5N1 viruses are spread by fecal–oral transmission rather than by aerosol, and that the viruses are
inactivated by drying of feces at ambient temperature. However, infectivity is maintained for at least 4 days in wet feces at
25°C. There were differences in the morphology of the H5N1 viruses isolated from birds and humans. The perpetuation of
H5N1 influenza viruses in the poultry markets in Hong Kong and the transmission of these viruses to humans emphasize the
importance of these markets in the epidemiology of influenza. The poultry markets are of critical importance in the perpetu-
ation and transmission of influenza viruses to other avian species and to mammals, including humans. © 1998 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
In late March and early May 1997, an H5N1 influenza
virus caused high mortality on three chicken farms in the
New Territories, Hong Kong SAR, China. Approximately 75%
mortality occurred on the three farms, with a loss of over
6500 chickens. Also in early May, a descendant of the
H5N1 virus contracted by a young child caused fatal viral
pneumonia with severe complications. This was the first
reported avian influenza to cause clinical respiratory illness
in humans (de Jong et al., 1997; Claas et al., 1998; Subarrao
et al., 1998). Following a lag phase of about 6 months, a
second “wave” of infection in humans in November and
December 1997 caused 17 additional cases and 5 deaths.
The ages of the 18 patients ranged from 1 to 60 years. The
clinical features of the first 12 cases, described by Yuen et
al. (1998), included an onset typical of classical influenza,
with fever and upper respiratory tract infection. However, a
high percentage of patients (7 of 12 cases) had severe
complications with pneumonia; gastrointestinal manifesta-
tions, elevated liver enzymes, and renal failure were also
usually prominent. The authors noted that except for the
index case, all of the children infected fared better than the
adults; the children under 13 years had uneventful recover-
ies, whereas all 7 of the older patients had severe disease
and four died.
By early December 1997, there was great concern that
an incipient pandemic of influenza was emerging in
Hong Kong. Human influenza cases were occurring with
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apparently random distribution, and the viruses isolated
were avian H5N1 strains. Because it was urgent to de-
termine the source of the viruses, an international task
force of virologists was assembled for surveillance of the
poultry markets. Influenza H5N1 was isolated from ap-
proximately 20% of fecal samples from chickens and
from approximately 2% of fecal samples from ducks and
geese. It became apparent that poultry markets were the
source of H5N1 influenza viruses, setting the stage for
the decision to depopulate Hong Kong’s poultry.
Prior to this outbreak, H5 influenza viruses had been
isolated only from avian species. The H5 influenza viruses
are perpetuated in a nonpathogenic form in wild aquatic
birds in different regions of the world and in domestic
ducks in Southern China (Hinshaw et al., 1980; Sharp et al.,
1993; Shortridge, 1992; Su¨ss et al., 1994). Only the A/tern/
South Africa/61 (H5N3) influenza virus has been associated
with mortality in its natural host (Becker, 1966). Highly
pathogenic, H5 influenza viruses previously isolated from
lethal outbreaks in domestic poultry (i.e., chickens and
turkeys) include A/chicken/Scotland/59 (H5N1) (Pereira et
al., 1965), A/turkey/Ontario/7732/66 (H5N9) (Narayan et al.,
1969), A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/83 (H5N2) (Bean et al.,
1985), and A/chicken/Querataro/14588/95 (H5N2) (Hori-
moto et al., 1995). Available evidence indicates that the
highly pathogenic avian H5, as well as the H7 strains,
evolve from nonpathogenic precursors (Ro¨hm et al., 1995).
Although previous studies found no evidence that A/chick-
en/Pennsylvania/1370/83 (H5N2) virus had been transmit-
ted to poultry workers (Bean et al., 1985), more recent
studies in southern China indicated low levels of antibodies
to all avian influenza virus subtypes tested in the rural
human population (Shortridge, 1992).
The present study characterizes H5N1 influenza vi-
ruses isolated from domestic poultry and from the mar-
ket environment in Hong Kong during the second wave of
H5N1 human influenza in November and December 1997.
The H5N1 influenza viruses initially isolated from chick-
ens in March and May 1997 were biologically character-
ized by antigenic analysis with monoclonal antibodies
and polyclonal sera, measurement of their stability at
environmental temperatures, and assessment of their
abilities to replicate in ducks, geese, pigs, rats, and mice
under experimental conditions. The studies established
that there were two antigenically distinguishable sub-
groups of H5N1 influenza virus circulating in poultry in
Hong Kong. Both groups were lethal for chickens and
replicated in experimental animals, but failed to transmit
between mammals.
RESULTS
Pathogenicity of H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from
poultry in Hong Kong
One of the initial requirements after an influenza virus
transmits to humans is to find a suitable vaccine strain.
There was an urgent need to isolate nonpathogenic
H5N1 viruses that could serve as a surrogate vaccine
strain. The pathogenicity of isolates from poultry in Hong
Kong was assessed by inoculation into chicken embryos
and sequencing of the connecting peptide of the HA. All
of the viruses examined killed 10- to 12-day-old chicken
embryos and the chicken embryo infectious dose corre-
sponded to the chicken embryo lethal dose (EID50–
ELD50). Viruses isolated from chickens (N 5 39), ducks
(N 5 7), and geese (N 5 2) were inoculated either
intravenously or intranasally into chickens. After intrave-
nous injection, some viruses killed the inoculated birds
within 16 h (range, 16–4 days; results not shown). After
inoculation into the nares, the time to death was longer
(2 to 3 days; Table 1). The lethal chicken dose (CLD50) of
human isolate (HK156-97) and the initial chicken isolate
(CHK258-97) was 0.5 egg infectious doses (EID50). Chick-
ens inoculated with either isolate developed disease
signs typical of highly pathogenic avian influenza, includ-
ing swelling of the head and leg joints, generalized
hemorrhage, loss of ability to stand, and general paral-
ysis. Each of the chicken, duck, and geese isolates
studied were lethal for chickens and showed similar
pathological features to the index human (HK156-97) and
chicken viruses (CHK220-97; CHK258-97) that have been
described (Suarez et al., 1998). Sequences through the
connecting peptide region of the HA of each of the
chicken, duck, and goose isolates showed that there
was no variation in the sequence at the connecting
peptide and that all viruses possess a series of basic
amino acids (RERRRKKR), but CHK258-97 has Ala at 211
while the others have Thr at this position (Table 1). Thus,
each of the H5N1 viruses examined was lethal in chick-
ens, possessed multiple basic amino acids at the con-
necting peptide of HA, and met the definition of highly
pathogenic avian influenza virus (Senne et al., 1996).
Therefore, none of the H5N1 influenza viruses examined
were suitable as a surrogate vaccine strain.
Antigenic analysis
To determine the antigenic diversity of the H5N1 influ-
enza viruses isolated from poultry in Hong Kong, the
viruses, including the index human case (HK156-97),
were analyzed with monoclonal antibodies (MABs) and
monospecific polyclonal goat and ferret antisera to the
H5 hemagglutinin in HI tests. A panel of 6 MABs was
selected from our pool of 17 MABs based on discrimi-
native reactivities between isolates (results not shown).
Each of the viruses included in the study reacted with the
monospecific reference goat antisera, establishing that
they belonged to the H5 subtype (Table 2). Fourteen of
the viruses had the same reactivity pattern shown by
A/Hong Kong/156/97. Four viruses had reactivity patterns
resembling A/chicken/Hong Kong/258/97. The difference
between these two groups was loss of reactivity with one
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MAB. One virus demonstrated a unique reactivity pattern:
A/duck/Hong Kong/Y283/97 reacted with 4 of the 6
MABs. One of the H5N1 virus isolates gave variable
reactivity patterns with the MABs on initial isolation and
second egg passages, indicating a mixture of viruses.
Cloning of this isolate A/chicken/Hong Kong/728/97 at
limiting dilution in chicken embryos resulted in a reac-
tivity profile similar to A/Hong Kong/156/97. The postin-
fection ferret antiserum to the index human case (HK156-
97) discriminated between itself and all of the other
H5N1 isolates (Table 2), but did not differentiate them
into distinguishable groups. Similarly, the monospecific
goat anti-H5 serum did not discriminate between the two
groups of viruses that are separable by MAB CP46.
Antigenic analysis of nonpathogenic H5 influenza vi-
ruses isolated from different regions of the world showed
reactivity with the panel of MABs and with the reference
polyclonal goat antiserum. This panel of antibodies did
not discriminate between the earlier H5 isolated from
Hong Kong [A/duck/Hong Kong/698/79 (H5N3)] and the
index human case, and there was considerable cross
reactivity between A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/86 (H5N2),
A/duck/Minnesota/1525/81 (H5N1) and the index human
case. The other strains show less reactivity. Each of the
nonpathogenic viruses were considered potential surro-
gates for vaccine preparation and were provided to the
Centers for Disease Control and The World Influenza
Center for evaluation.
Characterization of the HA of the index human and
chicken isolates (Subbarao et al., 1998; Claas et al., 1998)
revealed the presence of a mutation at amino acid res-
idue 158 of HA1. We sequenced each of the HAs through
TABLE 1
H5 Influenza A Viruses Used in the Study of Hong Kong Isolates
Host Virus strain Subtype Abbreviation
Lethality for chickens
Nucleotides
of HA
sequenced
Connecting
peptide
sequences
Carbohydrate
at residue 158
Route of
inoculation
Time to
death
(days)
Pathogenic
Human A/Hong Kong/156/97 H5N1 HK156-97 IN 3 8-1767 TPQRERRRKKR 2
Chicken A/chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 H5N1 CHK220-97 IN 2 38-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/258/97 H5N1 CHK258-97 IN 2–3 21-1746 APQRERRRKKR 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/728/97 H5N1 CHK728-97 IN 2 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/786/97 H5N1 CHK786-97 IN 2 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/915/97 H5N1 CHK915-97 IN 2–3 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/silky chicken/Hong Kong/p17/97 H5N1 CHK17-97 IN 2–3 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/y385/97 H5N1 CHK385-97 IN 2 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/y388/97 H5N1 CHK388-97 IN 2 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/1203/97 H5N1 CHK1203-97 IN 2 21-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/976/97 H5N1 CHK976-97 NDa — 21-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/990/97 H5N1 CHK990-97 NDa — 21-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/w31/97 H5N1 CHK31-97 IN 2 295-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/w307/97 H5N1 CHK307-97 IN 2 295-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/w308/97 H5N1 CHK308-97 IN 2 295-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/p21/97 H5N1 CHK21-97 IN 2–3 295-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/w608/97 H5N1 CHK608-97 IN 2 295-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/w609/97 H5N1 CHK609-97 IN 2 295-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/w162/97 H5N1 CHK162-97 IN 2 449-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
Duck A/duck/Hong Kong/p46/97 H5N1 DHK46-97 IN 2–3 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/duck/Hong Kong/y283/97 H5N1 DHK283-97 IN 2–3 21-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
Goose A/goose/Hong Kong/w355/97 H5N1 GHK355-97 IN 2 21-1746 TPQRERRRKKR 2
A/goose/Hong Kong/w374/97 H5N1 GHK374-97 IN 2 295-1111 TPQRERRRKKR 2
Nonpathogenic
Duck A/duck/Potsdam/2216-4/84 H5N6 DP84 ND — 21-1718 VPQRETR 2
A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/86 H5N2 DP86 ND — 21-1718 VPQRETR 2
A/duck/Minnesota/1525/81 H5N1 DMN81 ND — 21-1721 VPQRETR 2
A/duck/Hong Kong/205/77 H5N3 DHK205-77 ND — 21-1700 VPQRETR 2
A/duck/Hong Kong/698/79 H5N3 DHK689-79 ND — 21-1700 VPQRETR 2
Turkey A/turkey/Ramon/73 H5N2 TRAM73 ND — 64-1091 VPQRETR 2
Gull A/gull/Pennsylvania/4175/83 H5N1 GPA83 ND — 21-1721 VPQRETR 2
a RNA analysis only. ND, not determined.
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this region and found that the viruses could be separated
into two groups on the basis of the presence or absence
of a potential carbohydrate at this site (Table 1) and that
the reactivity of one of our monoclonal antibodies (CP46)
correlated with the presence or absence of this muta-
tional change.
The neuraminidase of each of the H5N1 viruses were
identified with a panel of monospecific antisera to the
nine neuraminidase subtypes. Each of the viruses re-
acted with the N1 antisera and partial sequencing of
each gene encoding the NA confirmed that they be-
longed to the N1 subtype (results not shown).
Animal studies
Since the H5N1 influenza in Hong Kong transmitted to
and caused severe infection in humans, studies were
done to establish the properties of these viruses in
experimental animals.
Replication in ducks. Since wild ducks are regarded as
a possible reservoir for influenza viruses, and virus was
isolated from fecal samples collected under duck cages
in the poultry markets, studies were done in this species
to determine the extent of replication. The virus from the
index human case (HK156-97), an early chicken isolate
(CHK258-97), and a duck isolate (DHKY283-97) were in-
oculated into groups of Pekin ducks by the oral and nasal
routes. Both the human and the chicken viruses grew to
very low titers (2.5 vs 1.5 for CHK258-97 and HK156-97) in
the trachea and were shed in the feces of less than half
the ducks, but the duck isolate failed to replicate (Table
3). None of the viruses caused disease signs and food
intake was not diminished. The CHK258-97 (H5N1) virus
was shed for a longer period of time from the trachea
than was the human H5N1 virus, but the shedding oc-
curred in only two of the six ducks inoculated. Thus, both
the chicken and human H5N1 viruses tested have the
ability to replicate in ducks, but the duck isolate’s failure
to replicate raises the possibility that these are not duck
isolates.
Replication in geese. Since H5N1 influenza viruses
were isolated from apparently healthy geese in the poul-
try markets in Hong Kong, isolates from humans, chick-
TABLE 2
Antigenic Analysis of H5N1 Influenza Viruses from Poultry in Hong Kong
VIRUSES
Monoclonal antibodies HI titers to Polyclonal sera
Glycosylation
at amino
acid 158
(1/2) CHO
A/chicken/PA/1370/83 A/chicken/PA/8125/83
Anti-A/
tern/
Sa/61
(goat)
Anti-A/
HK/
156/97
(ferret)CP24 CP25 CP46 CP58 176/26 406/7
Pathogenic strains
A/Hong Kong/156/97 400 400 12800 6400 3200 1600 240 640 2
A/silky chicken/Hong Kong/
P17/97 400 400 800 3200 1600 400 40 40 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/W31/97 400 400 3200 3200 3200 1600 320 80 2
A/goose/Hong Kong/W374/97 400 400 3200 6400 3200 800 160 80 2
A/duck/Hong Kong/Y283/97 , , 6400 6400 6400 3200 640 40 2
High path Hong Konga 200–800 200–800 1600–12800 3200–12800 1600–3200 400–3200 80–640 40–640 2
A/chicken/Hong Kong/258/97 800 400 , 3200 1600 200 40 20 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 800 400 , $12800 3200 200 40 40 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/786/97 800 400 , 3200 3200 400 80 40 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/Y385/97 800 400 , 3200 3200 400 40 80 1
A/chicken/Hong Kong/Y388/97 800 800 , 3200 NT 400 80 NT 1
Nonpathogenic strains
A/duck/Singapore/3/97 100 100 3200 6400 6400 3200 160 80 NT
A/duck/Hong Kong/698/79 400 800 1600 6400 6400 3200 160 NT NT
A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/86 100 400 6400 12800 6400 6400 2560 NT NT
A/duck/Minnesota/1525/81 800 1600 6400 12800 12800 6400 640 NT NT
A/duck/Potsdam/2216-4/84 , 100 12800 12800 6400 3200 2560 NT NT
A/turkey/Ramon/73 , , 6400 100 200 , 5120 NT NT
A/gull/Pennsylvania/4175/83 , , , 12800 6400 1600 640 NT NT
Reference strains
A/tern/SA/61 , , 1600 400 400 , 80 10 2
A/chicken/Pennsylvania/
1370/83 3200 6400 6400 6400 3200 3200 160 40 2
Note. NT, not tested. ,, less than 100.
a Range of antibody titers for 11 isolates.
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ens, ducks, and geese were inoculated into groups of
geese. Each of the viruses replicated to modest titers in
geese and was shed in the feces (Table 4). The
CHK258-97 and GHKW355-97 viruses were shed for an
extended period (13 days). Each of the H5N1 viruses
tested replicated in geese and was shed in modest
infectivity titers from both the trachea and the feces
(1.0–4.0 log10/ml). It is noteworthy that the chicken isolate
(CHK258-97) caused disease signs in 3 of 6 and mortality
in 1 of 6 geese, and that the goose isolate (GHKW355-97)
caused mortality in 1 of 5 geese. The disease signs
included inflammation and red hemorrhage streaks on
the leg joints and reddening of the beak. The lungs of the
dead birds were severely hemorrhaged with virus titers
of 3.5 log10/ml; higher titers of virus were detected in
the brain (5.8 log10/ml), and the birds showed general
TABLE 3
Replication of H5N1 Influenza Viruses in Domestic Ducks
Virus Day
Infectivity titers in chicken embryos
Trachea Cloaca
Shedding (N 5 6) Titer log10/ml Shedding (N 5 6) Titer log10/ml
A/Hong Kong/156/97 1 0 0 1 ;1.5
2 2 ,1.5 3 0–1.5
3 0 0 2 ;1.5
4 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
A/chicken/Hong Kong/258/97 1 1 ,1.5 1 ;1.5
2 2 ,1.5 1 ;1.5
3 1 2.6 0 0
4 2 1.5–2.5 0 0
5 1 2.5 0 0
A/duck/Hong Kong/Y283/97 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
TABLE 4
Replication of H5N1 Influenza Viruses in Geese
Virus Day
Infectivity titers (log10/ml)
DiseaseTrachea Cloaca
No shedding Titer (range) No shedding Titer (range) Signs Death
HK156-97 3 2/2 2.5–3.2 1/2 2.5 0/2
5 2/2 3.0–4.0 2/2 1.0–3.25 0/2
CHK258-97 (E1)a 3 1/1 3.0 1/1 4.2 2/2 1/2
5 1/1 2.3 1/1 3.8 1/1
CHK258-97 (E2)b 3 1/4 3.8 2/4 2.2–2.5 0/4
5 4/4 2.2–3.5 4/4 2.5–4.0 1/4c
13 0/4 — 1/4 3.2 0/4
DHKY283-97 3 3/3 2.5–2.8 3/3 2.5–3.5 0/3
5 1/3 2.5 2/3 2.75–4.0 0/3
GHKW355-97 3 3/5 2.2–3.6 2/5 0–2.5 0/5
5 2/5 1.0–4.0 2/5 ;2.2 1/5d 1/5
13 0/5 — 2/4 ;2.2 0/4
a E1, experiment 1.
b E2, experiment 2.
c Red hemorrhage on legs.
d Red hemorrhage on legs and beak.
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malaise before death. Thus, these H5N1 viruses showed
a higher propensity to infect and cause disease in geese
than in ducks.
Replication in pigs. Pigs are considered the interme-
diate host in the transmission of influenza viruses be-
tween avians and humans (Scholtissek et al., 1993; Ito et
al., 1998) so they were tested for their ability to replicate
the H5N1 viruses. Pigs were infected with the index
human H5N1 strain (HK156-97) and an initial chicken
isolate (CHK258-97) by the oral and nasal routes, and the
results are given in Fig. 1. Both the human and chicken
H5N1 viruses replicated in pigs, but the chicken isolate
replicated to higher titers (4.5 log10/ml) in pigs than did
the index human virus (;3.6 log10/ml). Neither the human
nor the chicken isolates transmitted to contact pigs in the
same pen. Thus, pigs support the replication of the H5N1
virus to only modest titers, and there was no detectable
transmission to contact animals.
Replication in mice. Mice serve as a useful animal
model system for studying influenza viruses, and the
index human H5N1 virus was inoculated into mice.
Balb/c mice were infected intranasally with the virus and
the results are given in Fig. 2. The virus replicated in the
lungs on initial infection and killed the animals. Infectivity
titers ranged from 5.5–5.6 log10/ml (results not shown),
and virus was detected at very low titers in the brain
(;1.0 log10/ml). On the second passage from the lungs of
mice, high titers of virus were detected in the lungs
(7.8–8.5 log10/ml), and virus was detected in blood (3.5
log10/ml) and in the brain (2.5–3.3 log10/ml). The mice lost
weight (Fig. 2) beginning on the second day after infec-
tion. The twice-passaged virus killed mice by the fourth
day postinfection, and all of the mice had died by the fifth
day. The virus caused severe pneumonia and hemor-
rhaging in the lungs, but there was no evidence of gross
pathology in other organs. The A/chicken/Hong Kong/
258/97 (H5N1) virus isolate was also inoculated into
mice and caused 100% mortality on the initial passage
(results not shown). Neither the chicken nor the human
H5N1 isolates required adaptation to mice. Thus, these
H5N1 viruses have a suprisingly high pathogenicity for
mice. Contact mice kept in cages with infected mice did
not become infected, despite high titers of virus in the
lungs and the death of all inoculated animals.
Replication in rats. The poultry markets in Hong Kong
had a large rat population having direct contact with
feces containing H5N1 influenza viruses. To determine
their susceptibility to infection, Sprague–Dawley rats
were inoculated experimentally with the viruses listed in
Table 5. The H5N1 influenza viruses from humans, chick-
ens, and ducks all replicated to low titers in the lungs,
but only a portion of animals shed virus (Table 5). Virus
was detected in the lungs on day 3 but not on day 5,
postinfection. The goose strain tested failed to replicate
in rats. The viruses caused no disease signs, and the
rats gained weight during the experiment. It is notewor-
thy that the chicken isolate (CHK258-97) replicated to
higher titers (5.0 log10/ml) than did the other viruses.
Stability of H5N1 virus in the environment. The detec-
tion of H5N1 influenza virus in bird feces in the poultry
FIG. 2. Replication of A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1) in mice. (Top)
Percentage survival after first and second passage in Balb/c mice.
(Bottom) Percentage of weight loss of the first and second passage in
Balb/c mice.
FIG. 1. Replication of H5N1 influenza viruses in pigs. (Top) Infectivity
titers in the nasal tract of pigs infected with A/Hong Kong/156/97
(H5N1). (Bottom) Infectivity titers in the nasal tract of pigs infected with
A/chicken/Hong Kong/258/97 (H5N1).
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markets raised the question of the stability of the virus.
Studies were done on the stability of H5N1 in feces
collected from infected birds. The titer of virus in feces
collected from infected birds was 3.5 to 4.5 log10 EID50
per g. When feces were dried at room temperature
(;25°C), infectivity declined to nondetectable levels by
day 1. When wet feces were held at 25°C the infectivity
declined to 2.5 log10/ml by the first day and to 1.5 log10/ml
after 4 days (Fig. 3). At higher temperatures (35°C), in-
fectivity in moist feces dropped to undetectable levels by
the second day. When moist chicken feces were stored
at low temperatures (4°C), virus remained viable for an
extended time with no detectable loss of infectivity over
40 days.
Transmission of H5N1 viruses between chickens. Al-
though H5N1 viruses were isolated from poultry markets
in Hong Kong and were found to be highly pathogenic to
chickens after experimental infection in the laboratory,
there was very limited evidence of high mortality in the
poultry markets (approximately 1000 markets) in Hong
Kong. To determine the transmissibility of these viruses
between chickens, birds were infected and put into
cages with uninfected birds. Virus was detected in the
trachea and in the feces of inoculated chickens 2 days
after infection with a low dose of virus (5 LD50). The
contact chickens began shedding virus on the 4th day
after contact, and showed disease signs. They died on
the 5th and 6th days with virus in feces (.4.5 log10/ml)
and trachea (3.5 log10/ml).
In a second experiment, four chickens were housed in
a cage below infected birds (5 LD50). The pan used to
collect feces under the top cage was removed to allow
feces to fall into the lower cage. One of the contact birds
in the lower cage began shedding virus on the fifth day
after birds in the cage above were infected. Three con-
tact birds died (days 5 and 7), and one was not infected
and survived. When contact birds were housed in cages
adjacent to infected birds, but without direct contact,
there was no detectable transmission to the contact
birds and the birds remained healthy. These studies
indicate that the CHK258-97 H5N1 influenza virus is most
effectively transmitted by the fecal–oral route and that
aerosol transmission was ineffective under the condi-
tions tested.
Morphology. The H5N1 viruses isolated from chickens
and humans showed slight differences in morphology
(Fig. 4). On electron microscopy, the chicken virus
showed a mixture of long filamentous (35%; N 5 161) and
spherical virions. The virus isolated from humans was
predominantly spherical, with a few filaments (16%; N 5
220).
TABLE 5
Replication of H5N1 Influenza Virus in Rats
Viruses
Detection of virus on day 3
after infection
Disease
signs
No. shedding/
No. inoculated
Titer log10/ml
(lung)
HK156-97 1/2 0–2.8 0/10
CHK258-97 2/2 ;2.5–5.0 0/10
DHKY283-97 1/2 1.0–2.5 0/10
GHKW355-97 0/2 0 0/10
FIG. 3. Stability of A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1) at environmental temperatures.
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DISCUSSION
Analysis of pathogenicity by inoculation of chickens
showed that all of the H5N1 isolates examined caused
high (100%) mortality. Sequence analysis revealed that
each isolate possessed a series of six basic amino acids
at the cleavage site (TPQRERRRKKR) and all except one
had Thr at the 211 position. Thus, all of the isolates meet
the definition of highly pathogenic avian influenza vi-
ruses. It is noteworthy that these viruses caused rapid
death in chickens: after intravenous infection, some of
the isolates killed birds within 16 h, making this one of
the most lethal avian influenza viruses, similar to A/tur-
key/England/91 (H5N1). The H5N1 influenza viruses iso-
lated from ducks and geese in the poultry markets were
also highly pathogenic and were not distinguishable
from chicken isolates. Thus, none of the isolates was
suitable for use as a surrogate nonpathogenic vaccine
strain for use in humans and lower animals. The ab-
sence of nonpathogenic strains, which are considered
the precursors of pathogenic strains (Ro¨hm et al., 1995),
suggests that these H5N1 viruses had been present in
Hong Kong markets for some time, but had not been
detected for lack of surveillance.
Antigenic analysis of H5N1 viruses from domestic
poultry in Hong Kong established the subtype of the
isolates, showing that they reacted to high titers with the
panel of monoclonal antibodies to A/chicken/Pennsylva-
nia/1370/83 (H5N2) and to the monospecific H5 goat
antiserum. One of the monoclonal antibodies (CP46) de-
tected antigenic differences among the H5N1 viruses
that correlated with the presence or absence of a car-
bohydrate at residue 158 of the HA. The majority of
monoclonal antibodies did not separate the isolates into
different groups; the majority of the panel of 17 mono-
clonal antibodies prepared to the HA of A/chicken/Penn-
sylvania/1370/83 (H5N2) and A/chicken/Pennsylvania/
8125/83 (H5N2) reacted with H5N1 isolates from Hong
Kong, demonstrating that little antigenic drift occurs in
avian influenza viruses (data not shown). The experience
in Hong Kong established the value of having such
monoclonal antibodies available as reference reagents.
Some of the original H5N1 isolates gave different reac-
tivities with the antibodies after subsequent passages,
FIG. 4. Electron micrographs of H5N1 viruses from (A) chickens (CHK258-97) and (B) humans (HK156-97). See Materials and Methods for details.
Bar equals 1 nm.
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and biological cloning indicated that they were mixtures
of viruses.
Antigenic analysis of the nonpathogenic H5 influenza
viruses with monoclonal antibodies established that the
viruses examined shared epitopes. The nonpathogenic
Eurasian viruses most closely related to the index human
case were A/duck/Singapore/3/97, A/duck/Hong Kong/
698/79, and A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/86, and these were
considered possible surrogate vaccine strains for use in
humans. Overall, there was limited antigenic drift be-
tween the H5 viruses isolated between 1979 and 1997;
however, the presence of a carbohydrate residue adja-
cent to the receptor binding site may influence their
antigenicity, and its importance in selection of vaccine
strains for humans is still being evaluated.
Studies of the ability of the avian H5N1 viruses to
replicate in mammals indicate that, like other H5 avian
strains tested (Kida et al., 1994), these strains from Hong
Kong can replicate in pigs. The virus titers in pigs were
modest (3.5–4.5 log10/ml), produced no disease signs,
and neither the human nor the avian H5N1 isolate tested
transmitted to contact animals. Whether transmission
would occur under field conditions is as yet unresolved.
Pigs were being raised in Hong Kong within meters of
the infected chickens, but there was no disease in pigs.
It is noteworthy that experimental inoculation of Pekin
ducks resulted in infections of only 1
3
of the birds with
human and chicken H5N1 isolates. The duck isolate did
not replicate when inoculated into ducks. The possibility
must be considered that these are not duck isolates, but
that they originated from chickens in the same markets.
In contrast, geese supported the replication of each
H5N1 virus tested, and ;12% of animals developed dis-
ease signs and died. It is unusual for influenza viruses to
cause disease in aquatic birds. Inoculation of geese with
H7N7 isolates from geese that were highly pathogenic in
chickens produced no disease signs (Ro¨hm et al., 1996).
The report of a severe outbreak of disease in geese in
Guandong Province with 40% mortality (Xu et al., 1998)
associated with an H5 influenza virus, A/goose/Guan-
dong/1/96 (H5N1), may throw light on the origin of the
H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong. This virus was isolated
from geese in 1996 and may be the precursor of the virus
that appeared in chickens in Hong Kong. Guandong
Province is adjacent to Hong Kong and provides much of
the poultry for the markets.
The H5N1 viruses from Hong Kong were inactivated
within 1 day when dried and held at 25°C but were more
stable in wet feces, with infectivity being detectable for
more than 4 days. At lower temperature (4°C) there was
minimal drop in virus titers in wet feces in 40 days. This
indicates that air drying is an efficient method of decon-
taminating an area after all fecal material has been
removed. It also suggests that human infection requires
contact with freshly deposited contaminated feces.
Despite the presence of the H5N1 virus in the majority
of the poultry markets tested, only 18 humans were
infected, and there was no convincing evidence for hu-
man-to-human spread. Thus, H5N1 viruses lacked the
property of transmissibility from pig to pig, mouse to
mouse, and human to human. Even in chickens, the virus
transmitted only by the fecal–oral route, and aerosol
transmission was not demonstrated. The failure to trans-
mit by aerosol may be due to the relatively low titers in
the respiratory tract of chickens (3.5 log10/ml), but not in
pigs (3.6–4.5 log10/ml) or in mice (5.5–8.5 log10/ml). The
molecular basis for transmissibility is still poorly under-
stood. The HA has been associated with pathogenicity
and ability to replicate in the intestinal tract of ducks
(Naeve et al., 1984), but its contribution to transmissibility
is unresolved. The receptor specificity of avian influenza
viruses (Paulson, 1985) (a2-3 binding to terminal sialic
acid) is clearly not a strict host-range determinant but
may be important for spread from human to human. Pigs
have receptors for both kinds of viruses (a2-3 and a2-6)
(Ito et al., 1998), but only a subset of virus subtypes
replicate in pigs, and few transmit from pig to pig. Stud-
ies in pigs suggest that the NP, NA, M, and NS genes
may contribute to the restriction of replication of avian
influenza viruses in this species (Kida et al., 1994). It must
be kept in mind that host-range transmission is a poly-
genic trait and that an optimal constellation of genes is
required (Rott et al., 1979; Webster and Rott, 1987).
The role of ducks in the natural history of influenza A
viruses is well established (Webster et al., 1992). How-
ever, the available evidence suggests that wild ducks do
not maintain H5 influenza viruses in nature (Sharp et al.,
1993). Studies in seabirds, particularly in shorebirds,
indicate that H5 influenza viruses are more consistently
isolated from these species (Su¨ss et al., 1994; Webster,
unpublished data). In 1991, H5N2 viruses were isolated
from up to 20% of surfbirds tested in Delaware Bay,
mainly from Ruddy Turnstone (Arenaria interpres) and
Red Knots (Calidris canatus). Descendents of these vi-
ruses were detected in chickens in poultry markets in
New York and in chickens in Mexico (Horimoto et al.,
1995), suggesting that the migrating shorebirds may be
the reservoir of H5 influenza viruses. The presence of
influenza viruses in migratory birds in Asia has not been
studied, so we do not know if the shorebirds that migrate
from Australia to Siberia through Hong Kong are the
harbingers of H5 influenza virus. Extensive studies in
domestic poultry in Hong Kong and SE Asia from 1975–
1987 established that each of the known subtypes of
influenza A is isolated year-round from domestic ducks
(Shortridge et al., 1977). However, it is noteworthy that H5
influenza viruses were previously isolated only from
ducks and geese and were not isolated from chickens.
Thus, H5N1 is a relatively new introduction into chickens
in Hong Kong. Lethality and the spread of the virus to the
brain after initial intranasal inoculation are unusual find-
ings in mice. It usually requires multiple passages to
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adapt influenza viruses to mice, and few strains [A/NWS/
34 (H1N1)] are neurotropic after intranasal inoculation.
The mouse will provide a useful model system for the
resolution of high pathogenicity and the immune re-
sponse of mammals to a highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza virus.
It is still not known why these H5N1 influenza viruses
transmitted to humans when earlier studies on H5N2 in
Pennsylvania provided no evidence for transmission
(Bean et al., 1985). Since there was no evidence for
human-to-human transmission (MMWR 1998), each of
the 18 human cases must have originated from domestic
poultry. Since most poultry markets examined in Hong
Kong in December 1997 contained H5N1-infected birds,
we can speculate that the markets were the probable
source of virus.
There is serological evidence that influenza subtypes
other than H1, H2, and H3 have transmitted to humans
previously in Southern China (Shortridge 1992). However,
we do not know if transmission has been limited to the
Eurasian lineage of influenza viruses. The transmission
of H5N1 influenza viruses to humans and the high per-
centage of complications in humans (Yuen et al., 1998)
should serve to alert pandemic planning authorities that
all subtypes of influenza A viruses can potentially be-
come pandemic strains. The other important lesson from
Hong Kong in 1997 was that the separation of host
species can influence interspecies transmission. Thus,
chickens are now marketed separately from aquatic
birds. Marketed aquatic birds are limited to ducks and
geese, which are killed at a separate wholesale market.
There have been no additional cases of H5N1 detected
in humans or in live bird markets since the domestic
poultry was destroyed on December 29–30, 1997.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Viruses
The viruses were isolated in chicken embryos as de-
scribed previously (Shortridge et al., 1977), and some
were cloned at limit dilution in eggs or plaqued in MDCK
cells or chick embryo fibroblasts. All viruses were han-
dled in a BL31 facility approved for use by the United
States Department of Agriculture, and the research staff
wore fitted HEPA-filtered masks and took prophylactic
rimantadine.
Virus and serological assays
The viruses used in this study are listed in Table 1.
Hemagglutination titrations and hemagglutination inhibi-
tion (HI) assays were performed in microtiter plates
(Palmer et al., 1975). Monospecific goat and postinfection
ferret antisera, and ascitic fluids from mice containing
monoclonal antibodies were used in the HI tests; hyper-
immune goat serum was prepared to the HA isolated
from A/tern/South Africa/61 (H5N1). Monoclonal antibod-
ies were prepared to the HA of A/chicken/Pennsylvania/
1370/83 (H5N2) and A/chicken/Pennsylvania/8125/83
(H5N2), as described (Kawaoka et al., 1987). Ferret anti-
serum to A/Hong Kong/156/97–A/Turkey/Wisconsin/68
[R] was kindly provided by the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention.
RNA extraction and PCR
Viral RNA was extracted from allantoic fluid with the
RNeasy extraction kit (Qiagen, Santa Clara, CA). Ampli-
fication of the viral RNA was carried out by reverse
transcription–PCR, as described previously (Shu et al.,
1993). After purification with the QIAquick PCR Purifica-
tion Kit (Qiagen), the PCR products were sequenced by
the Center for Biotechnology at St. Jude Children’s Re-
search Hospital using rhodamine dye-terminator cycle
sequencing ready reaction kits with AmpliTaq DNA Poly-
merase FS (Perkin–Elmer, Applied Biosystems Inc. [PE/
ABI], Foster City, CA) and synthetic oligonucleotides.
Samples were electrophoresed on PE/ABI model 377
DNA sequencers.
Infection studies
All studies were carried out in BL31 conditions using
animals that were serologically and virologically free of
detectable influenza virus. The dose of infecting virus
was approximately 106 EID50.
Poultry
Chickens. Three-week-old specific pathogen-free
(SPF) chickens were inoculated with 1.5 ml virus by
intravenous injection or with 0.1 ml into the nares.
Ducks. Pekin ducks (young adults, 2 months old) were
inoculated with 1.0 ml of virus by the tracheal and oral
routes and into the nares and eyes.
Geese. White geese (Embden or Chinese, 4 weeks
old) were inoculated with 1.0 ml of virus by the tracheal
and oral routes and into the nares and eyes.
All poultry were observed for disease signs, and food
and water intake was monitored. Tracheal and cloacal
samples were collected at the intervals shown and ti-
trated for virus in embryonated eggs. Blood samples
were collected from chickens at 14 and 21 days postin-
fection.
Mammals
Pigs. Yorkshire white pigs (weanlings; approximately 4
weeks old) were inoculated intranasally with 1.0 ml ad-
ministered into each nostril with a plastic pipet. An uni-
noculated littermate was housed in the same pen with
two inoculated pigs to test for pig-to-pig transmission of
virus. Temperatures were taken daily beginning 2 days
before infection, and food consumption was recorded.
340 SHORTRIDGE ET AL.
Swabs from each nostril were collected daily and titrated
for virus in embryonated eggs.
Mice. Balb/c mice (approximately 8 weeks old) were
anesthetized and inoculated intranasally with 100 ml of
10-fold dilutions of virus. The mice were weighed daily. A
portion of each group of mice was exsanguinated at
intervals after infection, and organs were removed in the
order blood, brain, and lung. The organs were ground,
and 10% suspensions were prepared and titrated for
infectious virus in embryonated eggs and in MDCK cells.
Rats. Sprague–Dawley rats (approximately 8 weeks
old) were inoculated intranasally and orally with 100 ml of
virus. The rats were weighed daily. A portion of each
group was exsanguinated at intervals after infection, and
organs were removed in the order blood, brain, and lung.
The organs were assayed for virus infectivity in embry-
onated eggs.
Stability of the H5N1 virus in chicken feces
Chickens were infected with the virus into the nares
with 0.1 ml containing approximately 100 CLD50. Fecal
samples were collected from pans under the cages daily
and made into 10% suspensions with PBS or dried at
room temperature (;25°C). Aliquots were stored at dif-
ferent temperatures and titrated in embryonated eggs for
residual infectious virus. Dried samples were rehydrated
and similarly titrated.
Transmission of H5N1 virus between chickens
Two White Leghorn SPF chickens (6–8 weeks old)
were infected into the nares with 5 LD50 of H5N1 influ-
enza virus. Infected birds were placed in a cage with two
susceptible contact birds of the same age. A group of
four chickens was placed in a cage directly below the
infected birds and the fecal dropping tray was removed
from the upper cage. Other groups of birds were housed
in cages immediately adjacent to the infected birds but at
a distance where the beaks of the birds could not touch.
Electron microscopy
The H5N1 influenza viruses were grown in chicken
embryos and were examined after the second (chicken
strain) and the third passage (human strain). The viruses
were absorbed to freshly glow-discharged carbon-
coated grids and negatively stained with 2% phospho-
tungstic acid (pH 7.2). The samples were examined in a
Phillips EM301 electron microscope operated at 60 kV.
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